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The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
by Dumont Clarke, IV*
As the level of international trade undertaken by sovereign states or
their agencies has steadily increased,' so too has concern over the con-
tinuing validity of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. Although
the doctrine's scope varies from nation to nation, it essentially offers
foreign states a measure of immunity from the jurisdiction of domestic
courts. The strength of the sovereign immunity principle in a legal sys-
tem determines the extent of an individual's right to bring suit within
that system against a foreign state or one of its agencies. Most nations
have gradually restricted the immunity granted to foreign states, which
was once almost total. Now a concept of limited immunity prevails.
With a few exceptions, this general pattern of gradual restriction of
immunity has been followed in the United States. 2 The process of re-
striction was considerably advanced by the recent passage of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 3 The Act codifies some common law
rules of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and it effects substantial
changes in others. This comment will briefly review the development
of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States, and will analyze
the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in order to
determine its effect upon that doctrine.
I. Development of the Law of Sovereign Immunity
. The concept of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns was first
applied in the United States in 1812 by Chief Justice John Marshall's
opinion in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon .4 In granting immunity in an
*J.D. 1978, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1 See Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REv. 614
(1950) and S. SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 14-19 (1959).
2See Garcia-Mora, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and Its Recent
Modifications, 42 VA. L. REV. 335 (1956).
3 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1604-1611 (1976).
4 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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in rem action brought against a ship owned by France, Justice Marshall
stated the doctrine as follows:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign
territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the
immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though
not expressly stipulated, are received by implication, and will be
extended to him.
... Those general statutory provisions therefore which are de-
scriptive of the ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, which
give an individual whose property has been wrested from him, a
right to claim that property in the courts of the country, in which it is
found, ought not, in the opinion of this Court, to be so construed as
to give them jurisdiction in a case in which the sovereign power has
impliedly consented to waive its jurisdiction. 5
The doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity rests upon several
theoretical bases that Marshall mentioned in his opinion. 6 It has de-
veloped primarily from the concept of the independence of all sovereign
states. Since all are independent and thus of equal sovereignty, none
can be made subject to the laws of another. Closely linked to this con-
cept is the belief that allowing individuals to bring suit against sovereign
states will embarrass such states and deprive them of the dignity to
which every sovereign is entitled. 7 The doctrine has also relied for sup-
port on a general theory of comity among sovereigns. Each sovereign
state, not wishing to be subject to suit brought by individuals in the
courts of other sovereign states, has been willing to grant sovereign
immunity to foreign states within its own courts, in order to encourage
similar treatment abroad. A final factor was judicial cognizance of the
great potential that suits brought by individuals against foreign states
hold for disruption of foreign relations, a field traditionally reserved for
the executive branch of government.
From these sources, Justice Marshall formulated the doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity as it was to be applied in the United States
throughout the nineteenth and for over half of the twentieth century. 8
5 Id. at 137,146.
6 For an in-depth discussion of these bases of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see
2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 913-916 (1965) and S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 1,
at 3-14.
7 In the British counterpart of the Schooner Exchange, The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197,
207 (1880) (C.A.), the court relied heavily on this basis, declaring:
From all these authorities it seems to us, although other reasons have some-
times been suggested, that the real principle on which the exemption of
every sovereign from the jurisdiction of every Court has been deduced is that
the exercise of such jurisdiction would be incompatible with this regal dignity
- that is to say, with his absolute independence of every superior authority.
8 See Garcia-Mora, supra note 2, at 340.
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His opinion in Schooner Exchange, however, did not consider whether
the nature of the act engaged in by a foreign sovereign could possibly
limit the application of the doctrine. 9 The Court had occasion to consider
this question in the 1926 case of Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro. 10 The
owners of a cargo of olive oil had brought suit for damage sustained
during shipment of the oil from Italy to the United States aboard a
merchant vessel owned and operated by the Italian Government. The
district court, crediting the plaintiff's contention that immunity should
not be allowed when a foreign sovereign engages in an act of a commer-
cial nature, denied the Italian Ambassador's claim of immunity. The
Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on Justice Marshall's opinion
in the Schooner Exchange:
We think the principles [of the Schooner Exchange] are applicable alike
to all ships held and used by a government for a public purpose, and
that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people or
providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans and
operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the
same sense that war ships are. We know of no international usage
which regards the maintenance and advancement of the economic
welfare of a people in time of peace as any less a public purpose than
the maintenance and training of a naval force."
Thus the concept of absolute sovereign immunity was firmly estab-
lished, and it appeared that courts of the United States were unwilling
to limit its scope in any meaningful way.
Several unique aspects of the sovereign immunity doctrine de-
veloped in the course of its application in the United States. First, U.S.
courts developed a unique solution to the problem presented when a
purported agency or instrumentality of a foreign state sought to claim
immunity by virture of its relationship to the foreign state. They took the
position that when it was necessary to determine whether such an entity
should be accorded immunity, the judiciary should defer to the execu-
tive branch of government. The potential for embarrassment to the
executive in its conduct of the nation's foreign affairs was cited as the
basis for this deference; the executive, through the State Department,
should have complete control of foreign relations. 12 Thus, the custom-
ary method of obtaining sovereign immunity was for a representative of
the foreign sovereign to request that the State Department communicate
9 The doctrine of sovereign immunity as formulated by Chief Justice Marshall was
strictly ratione personae with no consideration of the nature of the act in which the foreign
sovereign had engaged that gave rise to the claim against it. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 2,
at 337.
10 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
11 Id. at 574.
12 E.g., Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Isbrandsten Co., Inc. v. Netherlands East
Indies Gov't, 75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). See Richard, Sovereign Immunity, 15 HARV. J.
INT'L L. 157, 169 (1974).
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the claim to the court in which suit had been brought. After making a
determination whether the agency or instrumentality of a foreign
sovereign was or was not entitled to sovereign immunity, the State
Department would either recognize, suggest, or reject the claim of
sovereign immunity and communicate its position to the court. Where
the State Department only "suggested" sovereign immunity as opposed
to recognizing it, courts professed to be free to reject the suggestion and
make their own determination; in reality, they rarely did so. 13 When the
State Department failed to make any recommendation, the cOurt was
free to make an independent determination of the particular entity's
entitlement to immunity. 14
Second, by generally refusing to grant immunity to an instrumen-
tality of a foreign sovereign that was operating as a corporation, the
courts grafted an exception onto the doctrine of sovereign immunity
which had no counterpart in other jurisdictions.15 This exception was
applied in cases where the corporation was both partly and wholly
owned or controlled by a foreign state. 1 6 It can probably best be
explained as a reflection of the uniquely American philosophy of the
sanctity of the corporate fiction and a concomitant refusal to look behind
the corporate entity to determine actual control.
While courts in the United States continued to apply the doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity, courts of other jurisdictions began to
question the bases of the doctrine and to restrict its availability to foreign
sovereigns. 17 The courts of these jurisdictions made the distinction - as
the plaintiff in the Pesaro case sought to have the Court make - be-
tween the acts of a foreign sovereign that are jure imperii and acts jure
gestionis.18 Acts jure imperii are those of a public nature; acts jure gestionis
are those of a private nature. All essentially commercial activities in
which a sovereign state might engage, e.g., operating a merchant ship,
13 SUCHARITKUL, supra note 1, at 191.
14 E.g., Miller v. Ferrocarril del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688 (1941).
15 See, e.g., Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 20
N.Y.S. 2d 825 (1st Dept. 1940); Telkes v. Hungarian National Museum, 265 App. Div. 192,
38 N.Y.S. 2d 419 (1st Dept. 1942). But where the State Department recommended
sovereign immunity be accorded a corporation controlled by a foreign state, the courts
were often willing to defer to the executive and allow such a claim. See, e.g., F. W. Stone
Engineering Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945).
16 E.g., Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercade de Henequen, 91 N.J.L. 382, 103
A. 397 (1918); Wedderburn, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations, 6 INT'L &
CoMp. L. Q. 290 (1957).
"7Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Ireland were among those coun-
tries that adopted the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity at a relatively early
date. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 2, at 348.
18 See, e.g., French Ministry of Finance v. Banca Italiana di Scanto in Liquidation, Italy,
Court of Cassation, Feb. 4, 1932, Annual Digest 1931-32, at 36 (1938).
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are acts jure gestionis. 19 It was with respect to suits arising out of such
acts that some jurisdictions began to deny sovereign immunity.
Just as was true of the original doctrine of absolute sovereign im-
munity, the genesis of the restrictive form of sovereign immunity has
many sources. Foremost among them, however, was the increase in
state trading activity that developed during the latter part of the
nineteenth and during the twentieth century. 20 Governments under-
took the. operation of railroads, shipping lines, and other extensive trad-
ing activities. As such state conducted trading increased, the incidents in
which states sought to claim sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction
of foreign courts increased correspondingly. 21 Concern for individuals
left without a remedy against a foreign sovereign was easily subordi-
nated to the more weighty national interests to be served by according
sovereign immunity to foreign states. However, as the number of af-
fected individuals increased, the bases for the doctrine were increasingly
questioned. Coupled with the simple increase in number of individuals
suffering injury in the course of dealing with a foreign sovereign was a
heightened concern for the rights of individuals and the principles of
fairness and nondiscrimination. 22 The doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity, formulated at a time when most acts of governments were
strictly jure imperii, began to appear increasingly anachronistic.
In adapting to these changed circumstances and seeking to distin-
guish between the different acts of foreign states as a basis for selectively
denying immunity, courts have encountered difficulties. Although the
distinction between acts of a commercial nature and acts jure imperii may
at first seem clear, courts have experienced great difficulty in formulat-
ing a test to be applied to any given situation. 23 One method developed
was to examine the nature of the act and deny sovereign immunity
when a particular act was essentially commercial or private. 24 To deter-
"For a more extensive application of the distinction between acts jure gestionis
and acts jure imperii see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 321
(1973). Brownlie points out the inherent difficulty that is encountered in trying to
draw a distinction between public and private acts of a government. "The short point
is that there is a logical contradiction in seeking to distinquish between the 'sovereign'
and 'non-sovereign' acts of a state. The concept of acts jure gestionis, of commercial,
non-sovereign, or less essential activity, requires value judgments which rest on
political assumptions as to the proper sphere of state activity and of priorities in state
policies." Id. at 323. In holding that a foreign state retains its immunity with respect to
claims arising out of its operation of a merchant ship, the Supreme Court echoes the
same concept. "We know of no international usage which regards the maintenance
and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time of peace any less a
public purpose than the maintenance and training of a naval force." Berizzi Bros. V
S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926).
20 See Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 1951 BRIT. Y.
B. INT'L L. 220.
21 Id. at 226.
22 Garcia-Mora, supra note 2, at 343-44.
2 See SUCHARITKUL, supra note 1, at 267-75.
24 Id. at 269.
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mine the nature of the particular act courts looked to whether the act
was one in which a private person could engage; if it was, immunity
from jurisdiction would be denied. The second method of making the
distinction was to examine the purpose of the act and determine
whether it was traditionally a function of a sovereign state or whether it
was a traditionally private and commercial one. 25 The difficulties in
applying either test have stemmed from the general lack of consensus
on the proper role of government. As the prevalence of state planned
and operated economies has increased, this lack of a consensus has
increased correspondingly. 26
Although the Supreme Court of the United States in the Pesaro case
reaffirmed its support for absolute sovereign immunity and thereby set
the legal precedent that U.S. courts were to follow for the next thirty
years, there were other indications that support for sovereign immunity
was eroding in the United States. 27 Many of the treaties of friendship,
commerce, and navigation negotiated by the State Department during
this period expressly provided that neither party to the treaty would
invoke sovereign immunity to protect publicly owned enterprises en-
gaged in commercial manufacturing or shipping activities in the other
country. 2 Judicial opinions which applied the theory of absolute im-
munity began to discuss the concept of restrictive immunity and com-
pare the two.29 Extensive analysis and comparison of the competing
theories appeared in legal periodicals with the majority of that analysis
clearly favoring the adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity. 30
In 1952 the State Department adopted the doctrine of restrictive
sovereign immunity in a letter from its Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B.
25 BROWNLIE, supra note 19, at 324.
26 Despite the difficulty in applying criteria on which the distinction between
acts jure gestionis and acts jure imperii can be made, the number of countries
adhering to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity steadily increased.
France, Italy, and Belgium were in the vanguard of the movement to limit
sovereign immunity, but their formulation of the doctrine has been adopted by
the courts of Germany, Egypt, Switzertand, and others. Until recently, the courts
of the United States and Great Britain, however, continued to apply the doctrine
of absolute sovereign immunity.
27 In a communication by the State Department with respect to the Pesaro case itself, it
was suggested that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be limited by not extending
it to state owned commercial ships. Letter from Secretary of State Lansing to Attorney
General McGregor (Sept. 18, 1918), reprinted in 2 HACKWORrH, INT'L LAW 429-30 (1941). It
was the judiciary in the United States that steadfastly refused to limit the doctrine.
SUCHARITKUL, supra note 1, at 195.
28 E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, 63
Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965 (1949).
29 E.g., Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 20
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dept. 1940).
30 E.g., Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States when Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A
Proposed Solution, 27 MICH. L. REv. 751 (1929); Note, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the
New York Court of Appeals, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 453 (1940).
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Tate, to the Department of Justice. 3 1 The letter announced, "it will
hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign govern-
ments for a grant of sovereign immunity." The Tate letter acknowledged
that a "shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts." 32 It
did, however, express the hope that the courts would be influenced by
the decision and would follow the executive's change in policy.
Although the courts have generally accepted the shift in executive
policy and have applied the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity, 33
problems have persisted. First, in deciding whether to allow a claim of
sovereign immunity, the State Department makes what is essentially a
judicial determination thus violating the traditional separation of pow-
ers. Executive interference has increased as the number of claims has
multiplied and the State Department has been called on to make more
recommendations to the courts. 34 Second, the State Department has
never enunciated clear guidelines for making its determination and has
been susceptible to political pressure brought by foreign states seeking a
favorable recommendation on a claim of sovereign immunity. 35 The re-
sult has often been a suggestion of sovereign immunity from the State
Department in a situation where the act giving rise to the claim was
arguably of a commercial nature if not clearly s0. 36
A third problem that developed under the Tate approach was that
when suit against a foreign country was permissible there was no gener-
ally acceptable method of commencing suit against it.3 7 As personal
service on an ambassador of the foreign state had long been prohib-
ited, 38 individuals seeking to sue a foreign state sought to attach its
assets that were located within the United States seeking either in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction. 39 Although initially the State Department held
that property of a foreign state was not only immune from attachment
31 Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, To Department of Justice, May 19, 1952,
26 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter].
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Victroy Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General De Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
34 Letter from Charles N. Browder, Acting Legal Adviser to the State Dept., to Rep-
resentative Harold Donahue, July 24, 1973, Hearing on H.R. 3493, Before the Subcomm. on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 49-50 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on H.R. 3493].
35 See generally, Dobrovir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restrictive Theory of Sovereign
Immunity, 54 VA. L. REV. 1 (1968).
36 E.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd 295 F.2d 24 (4th
Cir. 1961); Chemical Natural Resources v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864
(1966).
37 See generally, Drachsler, Some Observations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54
AM. J. INT'L L. 790 (1960).
38 See In Re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890).
39 See, e.g., Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 221 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
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for purposes of execution but immune when attachment was used as a
means of gaining jurisdiction as well, it later reversed its stand and
indicated approval of the practice. 40 Once the State Department ap-
proved attachment of assets of foreign states as a means of gaining
jurisdiction over them, the practice increased rapidly. 41 Although in
many cases this method of obtaining jurisdiction was successful,
foreign states which incurred attachment of their assets and resulting
disruption of their activities increasingly expressed their irritation with
the practice to the State Department. 42
Conflicts continued to persist as well with respect to the related
doctrine of sovereign immunity from execution. In accord with the ap-
plication of absolute immunity from jurisdiction, American courts long
had adhered to a doctrine of absolute immunity from post-judgment
execution on the property of a foreign state. 43 The issue arose only
occasionally, and in most instances, foreign states were granted jurisdic-
tional immunity. 44 But with the change in policy initiated by the Tate
letter and the development of a limited doctrine of waiver of sovereign
immunity, absolute immunity from execution was questioned increas-
ingly as individuals were thus able to surmount the jurisdictional obsta-
cles to suit against a foreign state only to be denied an effective remedy
by the prohibition on execution.
Concern over these problems engendered by practice under the
Tate letter policy gave rise to a concerted effort to reformulate the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. In 1966, the legal staff of the State Depart-
ment, in consultation with representatives of the Department of Justice,
began studying issues that had arisen under the Tate letter policy and
preparing a draft proposal for corrective legislation. 45 By 1973, drafting
had been successfully completed and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act was introduced in the first session of the ninety-fourth Congress. 46
Although hearings were held shortly after its introduction, it was sub-
40 Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1st Dept.
1961).
41 Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposal for Reform of United States Law,
44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 901, 908-09 (1969).
42 See, e.g., Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 39.
43 New York and Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Dexter and Carpenter v. Kunglig Jamvaggsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 8% (1931). Even with the adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity
from jurisdiction, the practice of absolute immunity from execution remained unchanged.
Although there was only scant rationalization of its retention, it appears that the abrasive
nature of the act - seizure of the property of a foreign state - may have been the basis.
See Garcia-Mora, supra note 2, at 350. Courts of other jurisdictions, e.g., Egypt, follow a
restrictive practice of sovereign immunity with respect to both jurisdiction and execution.
SUCHAPITKUL, supra note 1, at 262-63.
44 E.g., Loomis v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
45 See PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 182-203 (1969).
46 H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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sequently withdrawn from consideration. After some revision, the Act
was reintroduced in early 1975, during the first session of the ninety-
fifth Congress.4 7 With only minor amendments, this second version was
approved by Congress in late 1976 and signed into law. 48
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has four primary objectives.
First, it shifts the authority to determine whether to allow a claim of
immunity from the State Department to the courts. Second, the Act
codifies the Tate letter's jure imperii/jure gestionis distinction and provides
a legal standard by which the distinction can be made. Third, the Act
provides a comprehensive scheme for commencing suit against a foreign
country, complete with provisions for obtaining personal jurisdiction
and methods of serving process on a foreign state. And fourth, the Act
provides that foreign states will no longer enjoy absolute immunity from
execution and seeks to draw a distinction here analogous to that drawn
with respect to immunity from jurisdiction. 49
A. Transfer from State Department to the Judiciary
A particularly troublesome question that arose under the Tate ap-
proach was the competence of the State Department to determine - on
the basis of its jure imperiiljure gestionis distinction - whether a particular
claim of sovereign immunity should be recognized or denied.5 0 The
policy to be applied under the Tate doctrine depended "less on political
judgment regarding the effect of litigation on foreign relations than on a
detailed analysis of particular facts bearing on the classification of the
activity on which the claim was based."5 1 Accordingly, it was suggested
that "[d]etermination of whether an act was jure gestionis or jure imperii
seemed, under the Tate approach, to be more a judicial than a State
Department function."5 2 Political pressure brought to bear on the State
Department in particular cases was also thought to have been influen-
tial and resulted in arguably inconsistent grants of immunity.5 3
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act transfers to the judiciary the
authority to determine whether or not a particular claim of sovereign
immunity should be allowed.5 4 Although it may still be possible, in a
47 The Bill was introduced in the House by Representatives Rodino and Hutchinson as
H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. It was introduced in the Senate as S. 566, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess.
48 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1554 (Oct. 22, 1976).
49 Letter from Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst and Secretary of State William
P. Rogers to the Speaker of the House, January 16, 1973, Hearings on H.R. 3493, supra note
34, at 33.
SO See text accompanying note 34 supra.
S Lowenfeld, supra note 41, at 907.
52 Id.
53 Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1225, 1234 (1974).
54 Section 1602 provides that "claims of foreign states to immunity [shall] henceforth
be decided by courts of the United States."
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particularly sensitive case, that the State Department will communicate
its views to the court, the grant of authority to the judiciary is essentially
exclusive.5 5 A foreign sovereign seeking to invoke immunity will pre-
sent its claim directly to the court, which will then hear evidence on the
activity from which the claim arose and determine whether such activity
comes within one of the exceptions to the general grant of immunity that
the Act affords. If it does, immunity will be denied; otherwise, the claim
will be honored.
B. Legal Standards for Evaluating Claims of Sovereign Immunity
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act begins with the broad prem-
ise that "subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act, a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States."5 6 After creating this broad presumption of sovereign immunity,
the Act qualifies it by providing numerous exceptions.
The primary exception is embodied in section 1605(a)(2); it essen-
tially codifies the jure imperiiljure gestionis distinction made by the Tate
letter in providing:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act caused a direct effect in the United States.
Elsewhere in the Act "commercial activity" is defined as "either a regu-
lar course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction
or act."57 As it is under this exception that courts will most frequently be
called upon to deny a claim of sovereign immunity, it requires extensive
analysis.
The first of the three situations in which a claim of immunity will
be denied is where "a commercial activity is carried on in the United
States." The definitional portion of the Act, both clarifies and qualifies
this exception by providing that "'a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by a foreign state' means commercial activity carried on by
55 Hearings on H.R. 3493, supra note 34, at 15. The possibility that the State Department
may, in exceptional cases, continue to make suggestions to the courts has aroused consid-
erable scholarly ire. See, e.g., Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, H.R. 11315 - The Revised State-Justice
Bill on Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 AM. J. INrTL L. 298, 311 (1976). It is
feared that any continued participation by the Department of State, other than in a techni-
cal sense, would result in the continued politicization of sovereign immunity claims and
should be avoided.
56 28 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West 1976).
57 Id. § 1603(d).
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such state and having substantial contact with the United States."5 8 It
would seem that the intent of this limitation is to accord foreign states
the benefits of the constitutional limitations on the assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction that were established by the Supreme Court in the
International Shoe case. 59 Thus, although the Act clearly provides for
denial of immunity where the commercial activity is carried on either
wholly or in part in the United States, it provides that there must be a
degree of contact at least beyond a bare minimum. 60 Once a plaintiff
shows the requisite contacts, however, this portion of section 1605(a)(2)
can be used to obtain jurisdiction in disputes such as an action for breach
of a contract to repair a merchant ship operated by a foreign state where
the contract was entered into and the repairs were made in the United
States, and disputes arising from commercial transactions relating to
import-export operations. 61
. The second of the three exceptions made in section 1605(a)(2) to the
general presumption of immunity in section 1604 is when suit against a
foreign state "is based upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere."
When presented with a claim based on such conduct, a court will not
only be required to hear evidence on and determine whether activity of
the foreign state conducted elsewhere comes within the section 1603(d)
definition of commercial activity, but will also be obligated to determine
whether the act performed in the United States on which the suit is
based is connected with that activity. Given this two step process and
the inherent difficulties of proof that it will engender, a plaintiff seeking
to rely on this exception can expect numerous problems. Despite this
heavier burden, however, there may be cases where a plaintiff may
prefer to proceed under this section, given the substantial contacts limita-
58 Id. § 1603(e) (emphasis added).
59 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The indusion of this
language indicates the drafters' intent to make the scope of jurisdiction in this section
coextensive with that exercised under state long-arm statutes. See Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt,
supra note 55, at 304.
60 As the Section-by-Section Analysis points out, the definition in section 1603(b) is
"intended to reflect a degree of contact beyond that occasioned simply by U.S. citizenship
or U.S. residence of the plaintiff." It was added to the Bill after it was withdrawn from
consideration in the 93rd Congress. H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), Section-by-
Section Analysis [hereinafter cited as Section-by-Section Analysis]. Both the text of H.R. 11315
and the Section-by-Section Analysis are reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 88 (1976).
61 Other examples given by the Section-by-Section Analysis, to which the courts will be
able to look as legislative history of the Act, include "import-export transactions involving
sales to, our purchases from, concerns in the United States, business torts occurring in the
United States (cf. § 1605(a)(5)), and an indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which
negotiates or executes a loan agreement in the United States, or which receives financing
from a private or public lending institution located in the United States (e.g., loans,
guarantees or insurance provided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States)." Id.
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tion on "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign
state."
62
The third exception, providing for denial of immunity when suit is
based upon "an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States," rests on the estab-
lished principle of jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct having effects
within the United States. 63 A court presented with a suit based on this
exception to the general presumption of sovereign immunity will be
required to make three findings. First, that the activity conducted out-
side the United States by the foreign state was a commercial activity;
second, that the act on which the suit is based was done in connection
with that activity; and third, that the act caused a direct effect in the
United States. As with the second exception based on commercial activ-
ity of a foreign state, a plaintiff seeking to bring suit under this portion of
section 1605(a)(2) can expect to encounter difficult problems of proof.
The Act gives courts little in the way of a legal standard by which to
determine whether a particular activity is commercial. In addition to
defining commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act," the one attempt
at a standard is in section 1603(d), which provides that "the commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose." Although this directive indicates a definitive
choice between competing methods of drawing the jure imperiiljure ges-
tionis distinction, it fails to provide the necessary criteria on the basis of
which the distinction can be made. 64 It is on this ground that the Act has
been most severely criticized; it was contended that the Act should
provide extensively developed standards by which courts could
62 The "substantial contact" limitation in section 1603(e) applies only to "commercial
activity carried on in the United States" and thus would not apply to "an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere." Although courts
are likely to require more than minimal contact in this area as well, the absence of an
express limitation like section 1603(e) may make it easier to meet that burden.
63 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
64 The legal adviser to the State Department, Charles N. Brower, gave some further
explanation of the test in his statement to the committee considering the Bill.
For example, a foreign government airline or trading corporation would
constitute a "regular course of commercial conduct" and therefore would
qualify as commercial activity. A single contract, if of the same character
as a contract which might be made by private persons, would ordinarily
constitute a "particular commercial transaction or act."
The fact that the goods or services to be procured through the contract
are to be used for a public purpose is irrelevant. For example, there would be
no immunity with respect to a contract to manufacture army boots for a
foreign government or the sale by a foreign government of a service or a
product. Hearings on H.R. 3493, supra note 35, at 15-16.
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determine whether a particular conduct was of a commercial nature. 65
Despite this pressure, the drafters adhered to their purposefully
indefinite approach, declaring that the alternative approach not only is
impracticable but also unwise. 66 Providing the courts with a degree of
discretion in developing the standard by which activity of foreign states
will be judged would appear to be the correct approach as it will allow
them to "give a liberal interpretation to the commercial activity
exception and to cast the net of jurisdiction widely." 67
A second major exception to section 1604's presumption of
sovereign immunity, waiver of the right by a foreign state, is provided for
by section 1605(a)(1). This exception encompasses both explicit and im-
plicit waivers. Explicit waivers are of two kinds: general and specific. An
example of a general waiver of sovereign immunity would be the terms
of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, providing that
neither of the signatory nations will claim sovereign immunity with
respect to suits arising out of commercial activities in which they shall
choose to engage. 68 Multilateral agreements to waive any claim to
sovereign immunity with respect to a particular activity provide another
example of general waivers of immunity.69 A specific waiver of immun-
ity is a waiver contractually entered into between a foreign state and an
individual with respect to a particular transaction or series of
transactions. Such a contractual provision generally provides that the
foreign state will forego any right it may have to claim sovereign
immunity as a defense to a suit arising out of conduct entered into
pursuant to the contractual agreement. It is anticipated that courts will
have little difficulty in applying this exception when it is based on an
explicit waiver. The one problem with such waivers has occurred when
65 Sklaver, Sovereign Immunity in the United States: An Analysis of S. 566, 8 INT'L LAW.
408 (1974); Comment, The Impact of S. 566 on the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 6 LAw & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 179 (1974). For a succinct presentation of the difficulties of applying the
"nature of the transaction" test, see the opinion of the court in Victory Transport
Inc. v. Comisaria General De Abastecimientos Y Transportes, supra note 33.
66 Statement of Legal Adviser to the State Department, Charles N. Brower, Hearings
on H.R. 3493, supra note 34, at 16.
67 Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, supra note 55, at 305.
68 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Federal
Republic of Germany, Oct. 25, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593. Article XVIII, para. 2
provides:
No enterprise of either Party, including corporations, associations, and
government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or con-
trolled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or other busi-
ness activities within the territories of the other Party, claim or enjoy, either
for itself or its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution
of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and controlled
enterprises are subject therein.
69 See, e.g., The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. In article 21 it is provided that government-
operated commercial vessels are subject to jurisdiction and execution to the same extent as
private vessels.
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some courts deprived them of their full effect by allowing a foreign state
to withdraw its waiver and plead immunity.70 Section 1605(a)(1)
removes that last impediment to the effective use of the explicit waiver
by providing that a foreign state may withdraw its waiver only "in
accordance with the terms of the waiver."
Section 1605(a)(1) also provides for implicit waiver of sovereign
immunity. Although the case law in this area remains unsettled, it is
sufficiently well developed to merit the inclusion of such waivers.
Examples of implicit waivers that have been developed by the courts
include situations in which a foreign state, before raising any question of
sovereign immunity, has filed a responsive pleading in a particular ac-
tion brought against it.71 Other less settled instances of implicit waiver
include situations in which a foreign state has agreed contractually that
the law of the country in which the plaintiff is attempting to bring suit
will govern any disputes arising out of the contract, 72 and situations in
which a contract between a foreign state and an individual provides for
arbitration and the foreign state refuses to submit to arbitration. 73 As the
Act provides for no delimitation of the doctrine of implicit waiver, courts
will be free to apply the doctrine as it has been judicially developed and
to continue to expand it to encompass other forms of implied waiver.
Section 1605(a)(3) provides that sovereign immunity will not be
granted where:
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state ....
The Act also provides for denial of immunity where such property is
"owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in commercial activity in
the United States," although such property is not present in the United
States. Although this provision of the Act makes it clear that a foreign
state cannot avail itself of a claim of immunity to block such a suit, the
70 Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
71 Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d
619 (4th Cir. 1964). Haynsworth, J., observed, "consent to suit is manifested and waiver of
sovereign immunity accomplished when the sovereign enters a general appearance, cer-
tainly if the general appearance is unaccompanied by a claim of immunity." Id. at 625. The
court noted, however, that even a waiver based on such conduct would not prevent a
claim of sovereign immunity where "the overriding political considerations would require
recognition of the immunity when the State Department suggests it is in the national
interest notwithstanding the earlier general appearance." Id.
72 Note, The Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns in U.S. Courts - Proposed Legislation, 6
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 473, 476 (1973).
73 Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, supra note 53, at 1237.
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plaintiff may yet be prevented from getting an adjudication on the
merits by application of the Act of State doctrine.7 4
Section 1605(a)(4) of the Act codifies a long-standing exception to
the sovereign immunity doctrine. It denies immunity to foreign states
where a suit puts in issue "rights in property in the United States ac-
quired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in
the United States." The exception was born of necessity and bolstered
by the traditional right of every sovereign to control the disposition of
property within its borders.75
Section 1605(a)(5) is designed to abrogate sovereign immunity with
respect to suits for monetary damages based on tortious acts committed
by a foreign state or any of its representatives while acting within the
scope of their employment.7 6 This provision is primarily intended to
permit a suit against a foreign state whose employees, while acting
within the scope of their employment, cause automobile accidents
which result in injuries to others. This section does not make the indi-
vidual representative liable, and thus does not alter the concept of dip-
lomatic immunity, but does offer the injured plaintiff, in such instances, a
sorely needed remedy. The abrogation of foreign sovereign immunity in
this section is limited by several provisions that are closely patterned after
the limitations on sovereign liability in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 77
74 Related to the Sovereign Immunity doctrine, the Act of State doctrine evolved
from the premise that "every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of government of another done in its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Like the Sovereign Immunity doctrine, it is largely based on the policy
of avoiding potential embarrassment of the executive department's conduct of foreign
relations by judicial restraint with respect to actions of foreign states. The Act of State
doctrine has been limited in recent years, both judicially and legislatively. See the
"Sabbatino Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)
(West 1970); First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
In the recent case, Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, U.S.
96 S.Ct. 1854 (1976), the Supreme Court relied heavily on the distinction drawn in
sovereign immunity determinations between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis to limit
the Act of State doctrine. The Court held that it does not apply to prevent adjudication of
the validity of "acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commer-
cial operations." Id. at 1861. Thus, while the Section-by-Section Analysis of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 and the statements of persons who paricipated in its
drafting make clear that this provision is not intended to affect the Act of State doctrine,
Hearings on H.R. 3493, supra note 34, at 20, it is apparent that the concept to be applied with
respect to sovereign immunity determinations has influenced and will continue to influ-
ence the development of the Act of State doctrine. Although it is unlikely that the inclu-
sion of section 1605(a)(3) in the Act will allow all owners of property that is taken in
violation of international law to adjudicate their claims, it will at least relieve them in most
cases of the double burden of contesting the application of the sovereign immunity as well
as the Act of State doctrine. Furthermore, it may well lead to further delimitation of the Act
of State doctrine itself. See generally, Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, supra note 55, at 310.
75 See Tate Letter, supra note 31.
76 See Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, supra note 55, at 305.
77 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-80 (West 1970). -
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The final exception to sovereign immunity in section 1605 relates to
the enforcement of maritime liens against foreign sovereigns. Its effect is
to deny immunity to a foreign state in enforcement proceedings where
the maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the state is "based upon a
commercial activity of the foreign state."78 The section also makes spe-
cial provisions for giving notice of a suit to enforce such liens.
Section 1606 of the Act accords a foreign state a general grant of
immunity with respect to claims based on its public debt. 79The immun-
ity granted by this section is expressly limited to foreign states and does
not include political subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. The lat-
ter will not be granted immunity from claims that are based on their debt
obligations. The immunity accorded foreign states by this section is
further limited to those cases arising from debt obligations that were
"incurred for general governmental purposes." The Act fails to provide
any standards by which courts can draw the distinction between debt
obligations issued for a specific purpose and those incurred for "general
governmental purposes." The distinction in this section, based as it is
on the purpose of the debt obligation, is directly counter to the explicit
directive in 1603(d) that courts, in drawing the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial activities of a foreign state, shall not
look to the foreign state's purpose in entering into the particular transac-
tion. Because the purpose test was rejected as impracticable in section
1603(d) does not necessarily mean it is an impracticable standard for use
with respect to the public debt. But the difficulties that have been en-
countered in applying that standard elsewhere may well be carried over
to this area, particulary as the standard here is so lacking in specificity
and guidance.
Although the immunity accorded to foreign states with respect to
cases related to their public debt incurred for general governmental
purposes may, in some instances, leave an injured plaintiff without a
remedy, that result is made unlikely by the inclusion of two qualifica-
tions in section 1606(b)(1). The first qualification provides that immun-
ity under this section will be denied where "the foreign state has waived
its immunity explicitly, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with
the terms of the waiver." As such waivers are usually considered by
78 The Section-by-Section Analysis indicates that the primary purpose of this section is
to create in personam jurisdiction for the enforcement of maritime liens so as to avoid
"arrests of vessels or cargo of a foreign state to commence a suit." Supra note 60.
79 This immunity granted to foreign states with respect to public debt is perhaps best
explained by the traditional public nature of such activity. Public loans were among the
five categories of "strictly political or public acts about which sovereigns have traditionally
been quite sensitive" identified in the well-grounded opinion in Victory Transport v.
Comisaria General De Abastecimientos Y Transportes, supra note 33. The strong possibility
that courts would hold under section 1605(a) (2) that incurring public debt obligations is a
"commercial activity" necessitates this special section on immunity for such activity.
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underwriters of public debt obligations to be essential to the success of
such issues, they will generally be included as a matter of course. 80 And
finally, section 1606(b)(2) imposes another substantial qualification on
the general grant of immunity in cases relating to public debt by denying
such in cases arising under the laws administered by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Immunity with respect to counterclaims arising during the course of
suits brought by foreign states in the courts of the United States is
governed by section 1607 of the Act. United States courts had early
developed the rule that by invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of the
U.S. to bring suit against an individual, a foreign state implicitly waives
its immunity with respect to at least some types of counterclaims.8 1
Although the concept applied initially only to counterclaims based on
the subject matter of the foreign state's suit, the Supreme Court, in
National City Bank v. Republic of China,8 2 approved lower courts' gradual
expansion of the doctrine. There the Court held that when a foreign
state initiates suit it will be prohibited from claiming immunity not only
with respect to counterclaims based on the subject matter of the state's
suit but also with respect to any counterclaim to the extent that it does
not exceed the amount of the state's claim. For purpose of codification
and clarification, the drafters of the Act thought it advisable to include a
separate section on the extent of such implicit waiver.
A foreign state will be unable to invoke immunity from counter-
claims in three situations: first, where it would not have been entitled
to immunity under other provisions of the Act had the claim been
brought in a separate action; second, where the counterclaim arises "out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim of
the foreign state"; and third, with respect to any counterclaim, whether
or not such claim could have been brought independently, "to the
extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or
differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state." The logic of the
first counterclaim exception should be self-evident. If the claim could
have been brought in a separate action, judicial economy suggests the
defendant be allowed to assert it in the proceeding against him. The
second exception is the broadest; it will allow a defendant to assert an
unlimited counterclaim that he could not bring in a separate action
against a foreign state, so long as the claim is sufficiently related to the
claim brought by the foreign state against the defendant. The third
exception, although valuable, is somewhat limited in scope. It provides
relief to an individual who is sued by a foreign state and who has an
independent claim against the state which he would be unable to bring
80 See Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 399 (1977).
81 Kingdom of Norway v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 286 F. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
82 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
in a separate action because of the availability of sovereign immunity to
the foreign state. The extent and nature of the claim brought by the
foreign state will limit the relief which can be counterclaimed.
C. Service of Process Under the Act
One of the major difficulties under the Tate approach that led to the
present reformulation of the sovereign immunity doctrine was the
method by which suits against foreign states were commenced.8 3 A
party was generally compelled to attach assets of the foreign state to
establish either in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over it. This practice
often led to friction between the United States and the foreign state
whose property was attached. It was also, from a plaintiff's point of
view, an unsatisfactory means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state as courts were generally less than favorable to the practice. 84
Cognizant of the difficulties with this approach, the drafters of the Act
took two steps: one, they prohibited attachment of a foreign state's
property as a means of obtaining jurisdiction over it;8s second, they
included in section 1608 extensive provisions for service of process on
foreign states, their agencies and instrumentalities. Thus, an individual
with a claim against a foreign state, one of its agencies, or
instrumentalities, not barred by sovereign immunity, will be able to
assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendent and serve process on
it under one of the varied methods provided by section 1608.
In most of its provisions for service of process, section 1608 draws a
distinction between service on a foreign state and service on an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state. 86 The preferred method of service
on both, however, is "by delivering a copy of the summons and of
the complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for service"
between the plaintiff and the defendant. This provision will allow an
individual entering into a transaction with a foreign state, one of its
agencies, or one of its instrumentalities to contractually provide for a
method of service that is acceptable to both parties. In drafting such an
agreement individuals would be well advised to include such a
provision in conjunction with a provision waiving the immunity of the
foreign state87 in order to eliminate any question about the assertion of
jurisdiction or the method of service of process to be used in the event of
a suit based on the contract.
83 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
84 See Lowenfeld, supra note 41, at 924.
85 § 1609.
86 Section 1608 also provides that all of its provisions are "subject to existing and
future international agreements to which the United States is a party." Therefore, in a
given situation, some of the methods of service provided may be prohibited by agreement
or other methods may be available. It will be necessary for litigants to study the
agreements which apply to a particular situation to make such a determination.
87 See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
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If service cannot be effected on an agency or instrumentality under
the terms of a "special arrangement," section 1608 provides that it shall
be made by "delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized
by appointment or by law to receive service of process in the United
States." A litigant who is unable to serve process under the terms of a
"special arrangement" will generally find that service can be effected
under this method as most states require that an entity such as an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state that is engaged in commer-
cial transactions appoint or designate an agent for service of process in
the United States. 88
At the next stage, the provisions for service of process become
almost identical again for foreign states, their agencies and instru-
mentalities. If service cannot be made on a foreign state under the terms
of a "special arrangement," or on an agency or an instrumentality of the
foreign state by service in the manner previously discussed, the litigant
can serve process by delivering
a copy of the summons and the complaint, together with a transla-
tion into the official language of the foreign state, as directed by an
authority of the foreign state or of a political subdivision in response
to a letter rogatory or request, or by sending a copy of the summons
and the complaint, together with a translation into the official lan-
guage of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to
the official in charge of the foreign affairs of the state which is, or
whose political subdivision is named in the complaint, or (where the
suit is against an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state) to
the agency or instrumentality to be served.8 9
A litigant seeking to serve process on an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state has a third alternative at this stage as well. He may
serve process "as directed by order of the court consistent with the law
of the place where service is to be made." 90 Under this provision, a
plaintiff could conceivably convince a court to appoint an individual to
physically serve process on the entity in the foreign state where it is
located. A court could not do so, however, where the law of the foreign
state prohibits such service pursuant to the order of a foreign court. 91
88 See Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, supra note 55, at 303, n.29.
89 § 1608(2)(b).
90 § 1608(b)(3)(c).
91 The first version of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act that was introduced in
1973 included a provision for service of process on the diplomatic representatives of a
foreign state. S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), proposed § 1608. Strenuous objections
were made to this method, however, on the basis of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, and it was
removed from the final version of the Act. See Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 60,
at § 1608.
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Litigants seeking to serve process on a foreign state who are unable
to do so by any of the methods already discussed may have a final
alternative available to them. The plaintiff may request that the Secre-
tary of State send "two copies of the summons and complaint, together
with a translation into the official language of the foreign state" through
diplomatic channels to the foreign state. 92 The Secretary will comply
with the request in three instances only: one, where the plaintiff's claim
is based on a tortious act of a diplomatic or consular representative of the
foreign state; two, where the foreign state uses the same method to
serve process on other sovereigns; and three, where neither of the first
two conditions are met, the State Department will comply with the
request if "the foreign state has not notified the Secretary of State prior
to the institution of the proceeding in question that it prefers that service
not be made through diplomatic channels." Although it is unlikely,
given the other methods of service, that a litigant must attempt before he
may resort to service through diplomatic channels, that this method of
service will be heavily used, its inclusion will insure that in some
instances service can be made by a plaintiff in difficult situations where
other attempts are unsuccessful. It will thus serve as a method of last
resort available only under limited circumstances. 93
Sections 1608(d) and (e) offer defendants certain unique procedural
protections. Foreign states, their agencies, and their instrumentalities
will have sixty days within which they must "serve an answer or
other responsive pleading" after a complaint has been served on them.
Section 1608(e) affords all such defendants the identical protection the
United States enjoys with respect to suits brought against it; a plaintiff
may not obtain a default judgment without first establishing "his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court." 94
D. Immunity from Execution Under the Act
Both before and after the adoption of the Tate approach, a plaintiff
who was able to surmount the obstacle of a foreign state's immunity
from jurisdiction and obtain a judgment against it was denied the right
of execution against property owned by the foreign state. 95 Immunity
from execution arose largely from the same considerations that gave rise
to the concept of immunity from jurisdiction. That it survived in its
absolute form after the Tate letter, however, is indicative of the concern
that any limitation on immunity from execution would create even
92 S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973), proposed § 1608.
93 A similar provision included in the first draft of the Act that was withdrawn for
revision authorized service by this method as an alternative to be used without resorting
first to other methods. The carefully circumscribed provision that appears in the final
version of the Act is indicative of the concern that service of process through diplomatic
channels be used only as a last resort.
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e).
95 See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
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greater potential for embarrassment to foreign states and consequently
would interfere with the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. 96 It was
the position of the State Department after the adoption of the Tate
approach, therefore, that there is "a distinction between immunity
from jurisdiction and immunity from execution ... in accordance with
international law, property of a foreign sovereign is immune from
execution to satisfy even a judgment obtained in an action against a
foreign sovereign where there is no immunity from suit .... 97 Unless a
litigant who was successful on the merits of his suit was able to secure
voluntary compliance by the foreign state with the judgment, he was
generally left without a remedy. He might seek to have diplomatic pres-
sure brought to bear on the foreign state, but that method is cumber-
some and not particularly successful. 98 In many cases the foreign state
that chose to disregard a judgment awarded against it by a United States
court was free to do so.
As the adoption of the Tate approach made it possible for individu-
als to bring suit more readily against foreign states and their instrumen-
talities, the lack of an effective method for enforcement of judgments
against foreign states became a matter of concern. Therefore, in drafting
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the Justice and State Depart-
ments sought to limit the doctrine of absolute immunity from execution.
In doing so, they relied on the distinction that vas employed in the Tate
letter to limit sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. They sought to
authorize execution in satisfaction of judgments against foreign states
and their instrumentalities where property used for commercial activity
by the foreign state or its instrumentality is available for execution. 99
Because of the particular sensitivity of foreign states to execution against
their property, however, the Act imposes considerable limitations on the
availability of the remedy and may still leave a successful litigant
without recourse to satisfy a judgment.
The Act provides in section 1609, in accord with the presumption of
jurisdictional immunity, that as a general rule property belonging to a
foreign state, an agency, or instrumentality of the state is immune from
execution subject to any limitations on that principle in other parts of the
Act. Section 1610 then sets out the exceptions to that general rule under
which execution will not be prohibited.
Section 1610 first makes general exceptions to the grant of immunity
from execution on the property of foreign states, their agencies, and
their instrumentalities that is used for a commercial activity in
96 Note, The Impact of S. 566 on the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
179, 198-99 (1974).
97 Steven v. Zivnostenka Banca, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1st
Dept. 1961).
98 See Comment, State Responsibility to Espouse Claims of Nationals Based on Contracts with
Foreign Nations, 2 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 38 (1977).
99 Hearings on H.R. 3493, supra note 34, at 22.
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the United States. Post-judgment execution will be allowed where the
state or its agency has waived its immunity from execution "either
explicitly or by implication." The provision is virtually identical to the
waiver exception to jurisdictional immunity in section 1605(a) (1) and the
analysis of waivers under that section applies here equally.100 Explicit
waivers of immunity from execution are already in effect under the
terms of some U. S. treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation.
Individuals entering into transactions with foreign states or their
instrumentalities should bargain for the inclusion of such a waiver in
their agreement.
The lack of a developed doctrine of implied waiver of immunity
from execution will certainly give rise to considerable litigation.' 0 '
Courts have been reluctant to find any implied waiver of immunity
under prior law, and they may continue to limit its scope.' 0 2 The
drafters of the Act, however, purposefully left the concept of implied
waiver undefined, thereby giving the courts broad discretion in
determining what actions shall constitute implicit waiver.
Where the property of the foreign state or its instrumentality used
for a commercial activity in the United States upon which the successful
litigant seeks to execute "is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based," it will also not be immune from execution. 103
This exception is similar to the commercial activity exception in section
1605(a) (2) to jurisdictional immunity. This exception, although it is mod-
ified with respect to property of a foreign state's agency or instrumental-
ity by section 1610(b), is certain to give rise to considerable litigation.
The litigatant seeking to execute against such property will have the
burden of showing that the propety is or was used for the commercial
activity on which he based his claim. In situtations where property that
was directly used for the commercial activity from which the claim arose
is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, a successful litigant is certain to
seek execution against other property of the defendant that was only
tenuously connected with the activity on which the suit was based. The
Act clearly leaves the courts free to develop limits to this exception on a
case-by-case basis. Also, an individual seeking post-judgment execution
against assets that are no longer used in the commercial activity on
which his claim was based will undoubtedly have a difficult burden in
proving that the assets on which he seeks to execute were formerly used
in such activity. The inclusion of this part of the provision is commend-
able and will prevent a foreign state from escaping the enforcement of
100 See note 68supra.
101 See generally, Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335
F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964).
102 New York and Cuba Mail SS. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
103 § 1610(a)(2).
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judgments against it by quick transfers of its assets. 1 0 4 It will, however,
not be a simple matter for a litigant to meet the burden of proof imposed
by this section, and it is likely that a foreign state that resorts to such a
transfer of assets as a means of avoiding execution will be prepared to
litigate the issue extensively. 105
Sections 1610(a)(3), (4), and (5) provide for three other exceptions
to the immunity from execution of property belonging to a foreign state
and its agencies or instrumentalities that is used for a commercial activ-
ity in the United States. The first exception, which complements the
exception to jurisdictional immunity in section 1605(a)(4), allows execu-
tion against such property where "the execution relates to a judgment
establishing rights in property which has been taken in violation of
international law or which has been exchanged for property taken in
violation of international law." 10 6 The second exception, which is con-
sistent with the exception to jurisdictional immunity in section 1605(a)
(5), denies immunity from execution where the litigant is seeking to
enforce a judgment that establishes "rights in property which is ac-
quired by succession or gift, or which is immovable and situated in the
United States."' 107 The third exception authorizes execution against
"any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such contractual obli-
gation" where a foreign state or its instrumentality has in effect a policy
of "liability or casualty insurance covering the claim which merged into
the judgment."'' 0 This third exception is included primarily to provide
for satisfaction of judgments obtained in suits brought under the section
1605(a)(5) exception to jurisdictional immunity for tortious acts commit-
ted by representatives of a foreign state while acting in the course of
their employment.
Section 1610(b), by modifying some of the limitations imposed in
section 1610(a), expands the right of an individual to execute against the
property of an agency or an instrumentality of a foreign state that is
engaged in commercial activity in the United States. Whereas, in section
1610(a) the right of execution is limited to property "used for a commercial
activity in the United States," execution may be had against an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state under 1610 with respect to "any prop-
erty in the United States" belonging to the entity if certain conditions are
satisfied. 10 9 First, execution will be allowed against "any property in the
United States" where the agency or instrumentality has waived its im-
munity from execution either implictly or explicitly. Second, such ex-
104 Hearings on H.R. 3493, supra note 34, at 22.
105 Section-by-Section Analysis, supra note 60, at § 1608.
106 See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
107 See text accompanying note 77 supra. There is an exception to this exception that
prohibits execution against property "used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or
consular mission or the residence of the Chief of such mission."
108 § 1610(a)(4)(c).
109 (Emphasis added).
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panded execution will be allowed where the "judgment relates to a claim
for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of
sections 1605(a)(2), (3), or (5) or 1605(b)... regardless of whether the
property is or was used for the activity upon which the claim is
based." 110 This expansive right of execution, which is provided in order
to enforce judgments against agencies or instrumentalities of foreign
states engaged in commercial activity in the United States, is a particu-
larly commendable change in the U.S. law of sovereign immunity. They
perform essentially the same function as do private American corpora-
tions engaged in commercial activities abroad, and individuals who
transact business with them should be entitled to the protection that this
broad right of execution offers.
Sections 1610(c) and (d), by imposing further limitations on the
effectuation of execution, offer foreign states unique protections. First,
section 1610(c) provides that execution shall be permitted only upon
court order. Before issuing such an order, a court must determine that
"a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry of judg-
ment." The Section-by-Section Analysis of H. R. 11315 suggests that in
making this assessment, "the courts should take into account proce-
dures including legislation that may be necessary for payment of a
judgment by a foreign state, which may take several months."
Section 1610(d) provides that the property of a foreign state, its
agencies, or its instrumentalities is immune from "attachment prior to
entry of judgment ... , or prior to the elapse of the period of time"
provided in section 1610(c) with one exception. Such property may be
attached prior to judgment where "the purpose of the attachment is to
secure satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may ultimately be
entered against a foreign state" and the foreign state, agency, or instru-
mentality has "explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to
judgment." The effect of this prohibition is to deny individuals the
protection of available attachment procedures to prevent a foreign state
defendant from removing assets from the jurisdiction of the court to
avoid their being subjected to execution in satisfaction of a judgment.1 1
When coupled with the reasonable period of time that section 1610(c)
requires to elapse before an order for execution against a foreign state,
its agency, or instrumentality may be issued, the prohibition on attach-
ment in section 1610(d) may deprive the claimant who is successful on
the merits of an effective method of enforcing his judgment. This rela-
tively broad prohibition of pre-judgment attachment is due, at least in
110 § 1610(b)(2). The sections provide exceptions to sovereign immunity where an
instrumentality of a foreign state is engaged in a commercial activity, where rights in
property taken in violation of international law are at issue, where damages are
sought for a tortious act causing injury, and where suit is brought to enforce a
maritime lien based on commercial activity of the instrumentality.
111 See Note, Sovereign Immunity: Proposed Statutory Elimination of State Department Role,
15 HARV. INT'L L. J. 157, 164 (1974); Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, supra note 54, at 308.
230 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.
part, to the considerable irritation engendered among foreign states by
the practice followed by plaintiffs since the adoption of the Tate ap-
proach of attaching their assets to secure jurisdiction over them.112 The
drafters of the Act may have envisioned scores of litigants attaching
available assets of foreign states to assure satisfaction of potential judg-
ments, when, in reality, protective attachment will not generally be
necessary. Such a fear would seem unfounded and, even if well-
grounded, might still be legitimately questioned as justification for
depriving those individuals who genuinely need it of protective
attachment.
Section 1611 specifically exempts certain types of property from
execution. Property of international organizations that is held for a
foreign state may not be executed against by the judgment creditor of
the state. 11 3 "Property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority
held for its own account," is afforded similar protection." 4 Section
1611(b)(2) provides that "property of a foreign state that is, or is in-
tended to be, used in connection with a military activity and is of
a military character or under the control of a military authority or
a defense agency" is likewise immune from attachment for execution.
Although the first two prohibitions on execution in this section are es-
sentially technical and will not affect the overall scheme of the Act, the
third may result in considerable litigation considering the volume of
military supplies and weapons that are purchased in the United States
by foreign states from private individuals.
E. Further Changes in the Judicial Code
As part of the transfer of authority to make determinations with
respect to claims of immunity to the courts, the Act makes several
changes in other parts of the judicial code."15 A new section 1330 is
added that gives federal district courts "original jurisdiction without
regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a
foreign state ... as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity." The section also
provides that "personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist"
112 See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
113 "International organizations covered by this provision would include, inter alia,
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank." Section-by-Section Analysis, supra
note 60, at § 1611(a). This exception to the exceptions from immunity was not in the
original Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as it was introduced in 1973. S. 566, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., (1973). Although such organizations are generally accorded immun-
ity, it was thought necessary to rule out any possibility that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act could be interpreted to authorize the attachment of assets of such
organizations that are held for the account of a particular foreign state.
114 The drafters of the Act feared that if such funds could be attached, foreign central
banks would be hesitant about depositing them in the United States. Section-by-Section
Analysis, supra note 60, at § 1611(b).
115 The jurisdictional changes will allbe made in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391,1441 (1970). A new
section 1330 is also added to Title XXVII of the United States Code.
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where process has been served pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
Section 1332 is amended to remove foreign states as parties from the
section, which gives jurisdiction to federal courts in diversity suits, be-
cause, with the addition of section 1330, this basis for jurisdiction over
suits against foreign states will no longer be necessary.
To clarify procedures for bringing suit under the Act, several
changes were made in the federal venue and removal statutes. A new
subsection (f) is added to section 1391 providing for venue in four situa-
tions: 1) suit may be brought against a foreign state, its agency, or in-
strumentality "in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated"; 2) suits
brought to enforce a maritime lien under section 1605(b) may be brought
in "any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of the foreign state is
situated"; 3) where suit is brought against an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state, venue is proper "in any judicial district in which the
agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or doing business";
and 4) where suit may be brought against a foreign state or one of its
political subdivisions "in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia." A new subsection (d) authorizing a foreign state, its
agency, or instrumentality to remove at will a suit brought against it in a
state court to federal court is added to section 1441.116
F. Conclusion
As one of the drafters of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ob-
served, "no one would contend that the jurisdiction of domestic courts
of the United States over claims against foreign states is one of the great
problems of the day." 117 Passage of the Act should, however, have a
salutary effect on the problems that have arisen as a result of the tradi-
tional approach to sovereign immunity in the United States. First, the
Act will assure private persons entering into commercial transactions
with foreign states or their agencies or instrumentalities that should a
dispute arise between them, determinations with respect to claims of
immunity will be made in a fair and consistent manner. Transferring to
116 Litigation has already occurred under this section. See Martropico Compania Navi-
era S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 428 F. Supp. 1035
(D.C.N.Y. 1977), where the federal district court remanded a case removed from state court
on the defendant's motion made shortly after the passage of the Act. The court held that
Congress did not intend the removal authorization to apply retroactively to suits against
foreign states or their instrumentalities filed in state courts prior to the passage of the Act.
It relied on the propective nature of the Act's grant of subject matter jurisdiction to federal
courts and the time limitation imposed on removal by the Act. Although section 1441(d)
provides that such time limitation "may be enlarged at any time for good cause shown,"
the court ruled that "To allow passage of the statute alone to constitute 'cause shown,'
however, would be to eviscerate that standard by making it automatically satisfied in all
cases pending in state courts on the effective date of the Immunities Act." Id. at 1038.
117 Lowenfeld, supra note 41, at 936.
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the courts exclusively the authority to determine whether a claim of
immunity will be allowed should depoliticize the process and insure that
an individual is not denied a remedy in order to further the foreign
policy goals of a particular administration. Courts, with their traditional
independent status, are far better adapted to making fair and consistent
determinations of this kind that depend upon application of general
legal standards to complex fact situations. Moreover, the role of domestic
courts as interpreters of international law will be enhanced." 8
Besides depoliticizing the immunity determinations, the Act, by
codifying and in some instances modifying the Tate approach, has the
salutary effect of clarifying the law of sovereign immunity. Although
one of the purposes of the Tate letter was to accomplish the same goal, it
failed to cover all aspects of the doctrine, and developments in the law of
sovereign immunity since the issuance of the letter have been extensive.
This clarification through legislation will create greater certainty in the
law and allow individuals contemplating entering into transactions with
foreign states, their agencies, and their instrumentalities to determine
what possible legal recourse would be available to them should the need
for such action arise. One result of this greater certainty with respect to
the legal rights one has available against foreign states is certain to be an
increase in trade with countries, such as the Soviet Union, which carry
on most of their trade by means of state controlled agencies and
instrumentalities.
The two major modifications of the Tate approach that are effected
by the Act are of tremendous practical significance to potential litigants.
By prohibiting the practice of attaching property of foreign states as a
means of gaining jurisdiction over them and substituting the extensive
service of process provisions by which parties can secure in personam
jurisdiction, the Act will make commencement of suit against a foreign
state, its agency, or instrumentality a far less complex process. At the
same time, the Act eliminates the possibility of further irritation of
foreign states as a result of attachment of their property. By abrogating
the traditional absolute sovereign immunity from execution, the Act
provides that individuals will not only have the right to proceed against
foreign states, their agencies, and instrumentalities, but, when success-
ful on the merits of a claim, that they will have a remedy as well.
In additon to the favorable effect it will have on the law of foreign
sovereign immunity in the United States, the Act can be expected to
contribute substantially to the development of international law.
Sovereign immunity is an area of international law that is peculiarly
suited to unification by multilateral agreement, and it is conceivable that
118 Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, supra note 71, at 1233.
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such an agreement will be forthcoming in the not too distant future. 119
The codification of the U.S. law with respect to foreign sovereign im-
munity clarifies this country's position with regard to such immunity,
and it could serve as a starting point for negotiation on an international
agreement. 120 Where the Act breaks new ground, e.g., by allowing a
broad right of execution against agencies and instrumentalities of
foreign states, it can be expected to particularly influence the develop-
ment of international law as other countries reevaluate their laws in light
of the U.S. experience under the Act.
Viewed as a whole, the Act reflects a universal pattern of restriction
of the scope of sovereign immunity. It represents a further shift in the
balancing of the need to prevent political embarrassment of govern-
ments at the hands of foreign courts against the need to provide a legal
remedy for the injured individual. Because the right of individuals to
effective legal redress against foreign states is increasingly necessary in
the modern world of extensive state trading, the passage of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act represents commendable progress in the
development of international law.
119 In anticipation of such an agreement, section 1604 of the Act provides that immun-
ity of foreign states shall be governed by its provisions "subject to existing and future
international agreements." The legal adviser to the State Department, Charles N. Brower,
observed in his statement on the Act:
We have done this [draft of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] also
conscious of the fact that the Council of Europe has prepared and has had
signed, I believe, by seven countries, a convention on sovereign immunity
and how the question would be handled in countries which are part of it, and
we do hope that we have something here in this statute before us that takes
into account what is going on in the rest of the world and which could lead us
to a broader and more precise agreement throughout the world. Hearing on
H.R. 3493, supra note 34, at 49-50.
120 An example of international agreement on the law of sovereign immunity is the
European Convention on State Immunity, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 470 (1972). Although
it is only regional in its application, it indicates a growing awareness that the problem is
best handled by multilateral agreement. See Mann, New Developments in the Law of Sovereign
Immunity, 36 MOD. L. REV. 18 (1973); See Comment, Sovereign Immunity from Judicial En-
forcement: The Impact of the European Convention on State Immunity, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 130 (1973). The Convention, although similar to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act in
that its basic thrust is towards restriction of the doctrine, differs from it considerably in
several aspects. Rather than creating a general legal standard for determining when to
allow claims of immunity, it specifies particular acts with respect to which foreign states
are not to be accorded immunity. The Convention also provides only a very limited iight of
execution against the property of foreign states and their instrumentalities. Any future
general international agreement would have to resolve these differences in approach to the
question of state immunity.
